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INTERNATIONAL ETHICS FOR A NEW ERA:
THE PROBLEM OF THE KIND
WORLD POLICEMAN
LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN
SUPERPOWER WORLD.

HEGEMONY: POLITICAL MORALITY IN A ONE-

New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. xii + 263

PP.
Reviewed by FernandoR. Tes6n*
To many people, domination of one nation by another is a bad
thing, and domination of many nations by one nation is even worse.
Such domination or hegemony has been derisively called imperialism or
neocolonialism, especially in developing countries. In legal circles,
hegemony has been repeatedly denounced as disrespectful of state
sovereignty and self-determination. States are equal sovereigns, we are
told, and hegemony is a cruel and cynical way of thwarting in fact all
the sovereign prerogatives that weaker nations have in law. Is this view
sound, though? Intuitively we believe that some power inequalities are
morally wrong, but that not all are. For example, for most people a
democratically elected government that respects human rights is not
objectionable, notwithstanding the fact that it wields considerable power
over its citizens. In contrast, a dictator wields power unjustly. Are
international relations different? Is it the case that in international relations all power differentials are objectionable? If so, why? Or should we
instead say that in international relations, too, there are legitimate and
illegitimate power structures? What is wrong with the "hegemony of
freedom"?
Lea Brilmayer does not think that international relations are
relevantly different in this regard, and she is, in my view, essentially
right. In American Hegemony she defends the view that international
power inequalities, and more specifically American hegemony after the
Cold War, ought to be judged, like all inequalities, with the tools of
political morality. She concludes that American hegemony can sometimes be justified, subject of course to important reservations, such as
the requirement that hegemonic power be exercised to serve substantive
liberal aims. Brilmayer' scores important points in a number of running
scholarly battles, the most important of which is the debate between
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realists and idealists. Her effort to devise a liberal theory of hegemony
is commendable and, I believe, generally correct. The overall result is an
original, creative, and convincing book. I will examine the various steps
in her argument and offer some critical remarks.
I. THE REJECTION OF REALISM
In the first and best part of the book, Brilmayer delivers a powerful
blow to the school of thought called "realism." An important realist
tenet is that morality is useless in international relations because, unlike
individuals, nations inhabit a state of anarchy. The arguments that
Brilmayer marshals against the realists' dismissal of morality in international relations are original and powerful. She addresses the two main
realist arguments against international morality: the structural and the
jurisprudential. The structural argument is the well-known Hobbesian
security dilemma: nations cannot afford to be moral because other
nations will take advantage of their naive idealism. To begin, Brilmayer
counters the realists' various criteria that define anarchy. To the claim
that anarchy is the result of mere diffusion of political power, she
rightly points out that this is incompatible with the existence of
hegemony, which is precisely what she wants to discuss. To the claim
that anarchy exists when there is no formal international government,
she replies that such characterization is inconsistent with realism's own
insistence on describing true power relations as opposed to idealizing
equality. It should be important for realists that there is a hegemon, so
the fact that there is no formal government cannot count against the use
of international moral norms. As Brilmayer points out, if formalization
is called for, we might more plausibly choose to characterize the United
States as a "world leader" rather than deny the facts by insisting on
abstract equality.
The final realist claim is that anarchy is defined by the absence of
legitimate government (the jurisprudential argument). To refute it,
Brilmayer uncovers the ugly moral assumptions lurking behind such an
argument. Realists assume that where nations have continued interests

that cannot be advanced through the world's political process, they are
entitled to pursue them by any means. This, however, presupposes a
controversial moral view about means and ends, namely that the end
justifies the means. Even more revealing, the realist is assuming that the
interests in question are worthy - surely a moral belief after all. Brilmayer shows that realists portray domestic politics in the best possible
light while describing international politics in the worst possible light.
Kenneth Walz and other realists presume domestic legitimacy if there is
a government of some sort - any government. In international relations,
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however, realists presume illegitimacy, even if there is a "government"
of some sort, i.e., the hegemon. Brilmayer rightly denounces such a
methodological double standard. In short, the first part of American
Hegemony is a powerful, sophisticated, and I should think definitive
refutation of realism.
II.

THE LIBERAL THEORY OF HEGEMONY

Lea Brilmayer's work can be seen as contributing to a relatively
recent literature that reacts against a model of international law and
relations that seems at odds with important liberal beliefs. The realist's
dismissal of morality (already discussed) is perhaps the starkest example
of such illiberal assumptions. Another one is the assumption that
governments and states matter more than people, which is incompatible
with the normative individualism that is the centerpiece of liberal
philosophy and politics. Against such models, Brilmayer offers a normative theory of international relations specifically aimed at showing how
international political power can be justified on liberal grounds.
Her first step is to explore whether hegemony can be justified by
appealing to consent. She discusses various forms of consent: contemporaneous consent, ex ante consent, and hypothetical consent. Subject to some reservations, Brilmayer concludes that sometimes (but not
always) hegemony can be justified on one or more of these arguments.
For example, if nations have in advance agreed that the U.N. Security
Council may authorize the use of force to counter aggression, and the
Security Council in fact authorizes the United States to use force for
that purpose, then the United States is exercising military power with
the world's ex ante consent, given by universal multilateral treaty. The
U.S. then would be a legitimate "world policeman." Both contemporaneous and ex ante consent are conditional on settling significant preliminary issues, such as whether or not it is possible to infer consent from
very general norms, and, most important, whether or not governments
are always deemed to have consented for their citizens (I will come
back to this problem, statism, below). Brilmayer has interesting things to
say about these issues; for example, she points out that the collective
self-defense rationale is quite inegalitarian since it allows only those
states who have the stronger allies to defend themselves. The book also
contains good discussions of inalienability and coercion. Can a government consent to U.S. hegemony, for example, by signing away its
sovereignty (Puerto Rico may be perhaps an example)? Under what
conditions is ratification of a treaty consensual and not coerced? All
these are matters that people committed to "global liberalism" must take

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 16:681

seriously. Each case of alleged consent must be examined, Brilmayer
concludes, on its own merits.
Most interesting is Brilmayer's discussion of hypothetical consent.
Here she examines the claim, fashionable among international relations
specialists, that hegemony can be justified by appealing to the notion of
market failure. The argument is that hegemony is the only way to secure
the provision of public goods. Governments left to themselves do not
actually consent to arrangements that secure such provision because of
communication failures and other transaction costs that cloud their
rationality, as it were. If they were not so clouded, they would consent
to entrust the provision of those public goods (i.e., national security) to
a stronger state. Since they do not in fact consent, however, the
hegemon must take over and assert its authority to correct this market
failure. Brilmayer correctly points out that this argument proves that
some hegemonic power is necessary to provide those public goods, but
that the exercise of actual political power must be scrutinized to see that
it is not abusive, before it can be deemed legitimate.
Brilmayer locates the market failure argument and other consent
arguments within liberal theory. This is understandable, given the
liberals' insistence on popular consent as the proper justification of
government. Yet perhaps it is worth noting that the market failure
argument is not a liberal argument at all; it is rather a Hobbesian-realist
argument. For a weaker government worried about the provision of
public goods might well have concluded (say in 1980) that the Soviet
Union was the right hegemon to rely upon. Alternatively, that government may have been indifferent as to which superpower to bestow
power on, as long as either of them could efficiently provide the "public
goods" (basically order, stability, and security) in question. This line of
argument, though, in spite of its superficial and elegant simplicity, strays
as far from liberalism as a political argument can. A necessary condition
for liberals to recognize the legitimacy of hegemonic power is that the
hegemon itself be committed to substantive liberal values, regardless of
the question of market efficiency or the solution to security dilemmas.
Thus a necessary condition to saying that the United States is a justified
hegemon is that the United States be committed to the protection of
values that liberals hold dear: human rights, democracy, and generally
the respect of individual autonomy and dignity.
If this is so, what is the proper role of consent, actual or hypothetical? It seems that one is either a Hobbesian or a Kantian on these
issues, and that the two models (rational consent or natural law) do not
always coexist in harmony. The question can be put this way: consent is
indeed a necessary condition for the justification of government, but it is
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not a sufficient one. Political power must be justified both in its origin
and in its exercise. The origin, the pedigree of government is a
necessary condition for its legitimacy; and in this regard, consent plays
a very important role. Government must be the result of the will of the
people; it must genuinely represent the people. For liberals though, this
is not enough. Political power must be exercised legitimately as well; it
must respect the rights of individuals, and treat them with proper respect
and concern. Thus, a government that is legitimate by origin (e.g.,
elected by the people) might be de-legitimized by its tyrannical behavior, and conversely, a benevolent government might be illegitimate
in origin.
If we apply these very simple notions to international hegemony, a
number of problems arise. Even if the United States (let us assume)
wields power by consent, citizens in weaker nations might object to the
actual exercise of power - for example, by claiming that U.S. behavior
fails to respect their human rights. This fear may be reinforced by the
fact that the hegemonic government (the U.S.) does not regard itself as
obligated to advance the interests of people in other countries, but solely
the interests of Americans. This difficulty leads to the problem of the
legitimacy of the origin of the hegemon: people in other countries have
not elected the hegemonic government. Maybe Brilmayer can get around
this by pointing to contemporaneous or ex ante consent, but there is an
additional difficulty. The hegemonic government not only was not
elected by people in other countries, it is in no sense accountable to
them. It does not see itself, nor do others see it, as politically responsible to the "governed." I am not sure that Brilmayer would necessarily
disagree with this line of reasoning. My aim, rather, is to show that
these are genuine liberal concerns about hegemony that perhaps
deserved a more extensive treatment in the book.
Brilmayer recognizes this tension between pedigree and substance in
her discussion of substantive morality, but this part of the book has, in
my view, less appeal than the first one. This is due, in part, to Brilmayer's refusal to discuss possible universal foundations of liberal
values. There are also other problems in her discussion of intervention.
For example, she insists on the non-selectivity of humanitarian intervention. This seems odd, however: if I have the right to intervene to rescue
innocent victims, it does not follow that I also always have a duty to do
so. I might refuse to intervene even if I have a right to do so because of
the prohibitive cost of victory (think about intervention in China), or
because I just do not have the necessary resources. The mere fact that
the United States chooses to intervene in Haiti but not in Bosnia does
not cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Haitian intervention itself. In

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 16:681

fact, the arguments given by the United States for its reluctance to
intervene in Bosnia had nothing to do with the threshold question of a
right of humanitarian intervention, but rather with the alleged logistical
impossibility of succeeding. Liberal leaders are entitled to rely on these
prudential judgments. They may of course be factually wrong (as I
suspect they are in the case of Bosnia), but the fact that they do rely on
those arguments cannot be used against the permissibility of intervention. If I am morally entitled to save two persons who are drowning, I
might rationally decide that saving Smith is possible but saving Jones is
not (for example, I would be seriously injured in the latter case). Brilmayer is right that the United States (or any other government, for that
matter) should be non-selective in the moral condemnation of tyranny,
but this does not automatically carry over to military action: there are
important principles of morality and prudential statecraft that may
justifiedly prompt the hegemon to be selective. By the way, noninterventionists (not Brilmayer) have a funny way of arguing on this issue.
They are against intervention, but when one supports humanitarian
intervention in A, they retort: "But why don't you intervene in B also?"
So their claim seems to be now the rather curious one that the hegemon
is not intervening enough! In other words: the anti-interventionist uses
the critique of the selectivity of the hegemon as an argument against
intervention, whereas what the critique shows, at most, is that the
hegemon should intervene more, not less.
Brilmayer's version of global liberalism falls short, in my view, of
embracing all the consequences of the liberal vision. She rightly
identifies the inherent tension between liberalism and statism. Statism is
the view that states, not individuals, are the appropriate units of moral
concern in a theory of international relations. Brilmayer points out (as
have others before her) that by focusing on state consent and state
autonomy rather than on individual consent and autonomy, both traditional theory and her own (which also focuses on states) seem at odds
with important liberal commitments. As a way out of this problem,
Brilmayer favors what she calls "qualified statism." By this, Brilmayer
means that established governments are entitled to presumptive
legitimacy as long as they respect some minimal moral limits. If they do
remain within those limits (i.e., they do not torture, kill, or discriminate
against their citizens) they can legitimately give or withhold consent.
Brilmayer justifies this approach, at least in part, by pragmatic considerations. It would be impossible for the liberal hegemon to conduct
its everyday business if it had to determine in each case whether a legal
obligation was consented to by a legitimate government (in the liberal
sense).
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Still, it is far from clear why liberals have to make this concession
to statism. It seems clear under liberal principles that if A consents on
behalf of B to create rights in favor of C, the consent is morally valid
only if A legitimately represents B. A liberal theory of international law
and relations cannot escape this by falling back on the (illiberal) statist
assumption of effective political power as the basis of international
legitimacy. Undemocratic governments, then, are not valid consenting
agents, come what may. However, Brilmayer is right that this view
(which she calls "derivative statism," and which I and others have
defended) poses serious problems for international relations. Should we
disallow as illegitimate the consent given in the past to a treaty by an
unrepresentative government? Here I believe Brilmayer falls into the
realist trap: we must do it because this is the only pragmatically possible
way to conduct foreign policy. The consent by an unrepresentative
government is valid because there was no one else around to consent for
that state. Contrary to Brilmayer's thesis, this view does not necessitate
treating undemocratic government as legitimate or their consent as
morally valid. If the undemocratic government consented to the treaty,
democratic governments will abide by the treaty for a number of reasons
unrelated to the validity of consent. One is purely prudential: it is
necessary to honor the treaty in order to induce the illiberal government
to do something which is morally desirable (e.g., nuclear disarmament).
Thus the U.S. must arguably honor the recent agreement with North
Korea, not because it believes that North Korean consent was validly
given (it was not), but because so doing creates an incentive for the
North Korean dictators to do something which is substantively desirable.
Similarly, if the commitment is beneficial to the oppressed population
rather than to the dictator, then honoring it is the right thing to do, quite
independent from the question of legitimate consent. The basis for
honoring the commitment entered into with an illegitimate government
is thus not pacta sunt servanda, since there has strictly been no pactum.
The basis is instead a mix of prudential and moral factors that are quite
independent of the legitimacy of the unrepresentative government or the
moral validity of its consent.
Brilmayer's reply to this argument is not very convincing. The view
that the agreements entered into with undemocratic governments must
be honored only if they are substantively desirable (she argues) is inconsistent with international law which gives special weight to the fact that
the undemocratic government did consent. This begs the question,
though, for part of what we expect from a normative theory of international relations is to tell us what is wrong with international law, and
this is one of those things: that it improperly enfranchises undemocratic
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governments. Brilmayer also believes that the "substantive desirability"
argument is too paternalistic in that it does not respect the autonomy of
the people in undemocratic countries. Again, this move simply assumes
state autonomy, which is the very notion challenged by genuine global
liberalism. State consent is important (indeed dispositive in most cases)
when the government validly consented, and this happens when the
government genuinely represents the people. If that is not the case,
liberal democracies must try their best to do the right thing, which
includes respecting the human rights of everyone and encouraging (and
sometimes forcing) democratic reforms in those states. Put differently:
liberalism cannot countenance the "opacity" of the state. Brilmayer,
however, wants to justify a more liberal world while retaining the
assumption of opacity. As Kant (whose work is strangely absent in a
book devoted to the defense of liberal internationalism) showed 200
years ago, it matters greatly how nations are organized internally, if not
for any other reason than the fact that only a world of liberal
democracies can achieve both peace and justice.
III. CONCLUSION

My overall judgment of this book is very positive. The above
criticisms attempt to show that perhaps the liberal view needs to be
pressed even further than Brilmayer does, but her thesis is still
philosophically and politically attractive. If adopted and implemented by
democratic leaders in their conduct of foreign policy, the world would
be a better place. While I personally believe liberalism requires at most
derivative statism (i.e., the view of states' rights as entirely derivative of
individual rights), Brilmayer's qualified statism is a healthy improvement over prevailing models of international law and relations.
American Hegemony steers the debate away from ruthless Hobbesian
paradigms, and vindicates instead the elusive humanitarian ideal of a
cosmopolitan world order that rests on the universal respect of freedom
and reason. With this book, Lea Brilmayer confirms the important place
that her work already enjoys in the literature.

